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To Whom Do We Refer When We Speak
of Obligations to "Future Generations"?
Reproductive Rights and the
Intergenerational Community
Sherry F. Colb*
Introduction
Ordinarily, consideration of future generations' interests takes
for granted that there will be future generations to have interests. It
is, in other words, wrong to despoil the environment or fail to keep
the social security system solvent because our children, grandchildren,
and their descendants will inhabit this earth and have basic needs that
will go unfulfilled if we do not maintain our world in habitable condi-
tion. As long as people continue to exist, there are things they will
need to survive and thrive, and it is generally understood to be our
obligation-as current inhabitants of the planet-to live in a manner
consistent with their survival and thriving.
In some sense, we are merely "renting" all that we have, like stu-
dents who occupy a desk in a classroom and must accordingly be pre-
pared to "return" it forward in good condition to those who will take
our place. If there were to be no future generations, we would have
no obligation to leave the planet habitable. The earth would then be a
disposable commodity. If we knew that tomorrow at noon, all existing
lives would end and never be replaced, we would, by definition, no
longer have to preserve anything for future earthlings.
The question we generally do not ask, in considering what we
ought to do for our descendants, is this: must we bring those descend-
ants into existence? That is, do we have an obligation-as a group of
human beings or individually-to reproduce? If we have any such ob-
ligation, what are its contours? To put the questions in a different
* Professor of Law and Charles Evans Hughes Scholar, Cornell Law School. The author
expresses gratitude to Jason M. Levy (Columbia '09) for truly outstanding research assistance,
and to Naushin Shibli (Cornell '10) for thorough and speedy last-minute research assistance at
the end of the project. The author also appreciates the comments and suggestions of Michael C.
Dorf and Jens D. Ohlin on an earlier draft of this Article. Finally, the author thanks the students
on The George Washington Law Review and the faculty of The George Washington University
Law School for organizing and hosting the conference on intergenerational obligations of which
this Article was a part, along with the other scholars who participated in and contributed to the
conference.
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frame, do potential people have a cognizable interest in coming into
existence in the first place?
This set of questions is crucial to our thinking about reproductive
rights in the context of meeting our obligations to future generations.
If we do not owe it to potential people to bring them into being, then
who can make claims upon us (to preserve the earth, etc.)?
This Article argues that an analysis of reproductive rights in the
context of future generations yields three insights. First, potential
people (who may or may not come into being) do not-by any pre-
vailing approach to morality-have a right to be created by us. They
may therefore be ethically "prevented" from coming into existence
with what I call the "Offspring Selection Interest" ("OSI"). Second,
the OSI is often conflated with the distinct reproductive rights interest
in protecting one's body against unwanted intrusion, the "Bodily In-
tegrity Interest" ("BII"), with resulting confusion for reproductive
rights discourse. And third, once we distinguish the OSI from the BII,
we find a surprising amount of agreement, even among present-day
abortion opponents, with the premise of abortion rights: that the BII
is both weighty and directly implicated in the abortion decision.
To find evidence of consensus regarding the OSI, this Article
turns to western religious traditions as well as to modern legal rules.
To find consensus on the BI, this Article relies on accounts of abor-
tion that animate the pro-choice and pro-life communities within the
United States. The goal of the Article is largely descriptive rather
than normative: it aims to identify two interests that underlie modern
reproductive rights and to demonstrate that both interests are widely
accepted by groups that otherwise appear to fall on opposite ends of
the reproductive rights spectrum.
L The Offspring Selection Interest (OSI) and
Basic Reproductive Rights
The possibility of reproductive rights rests fundamentally on the
assumption that we lack any obligation to potential people to bring
them into existence and may therefore legitimately make choices that
either intentionally or incidentally prevent many potential people
from becoming actual people. Is this assumption warranted?
A. Prohibitions Against Rape
Rather than venture immediately into the area of abortion, which
is complicated in a number of ways, let us begin by analyzing a much
more modest "reproductive rights" agenda. Most people in the
1583
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United States would likely agree that a person has the right not to
engage in undesired sexual activity, even though such sexual activity
might yield human offspring who would otherwise never have come
into existence. This right to avoid unwanted sexual contact is implicit,
for example, in the unanimous adoption of criminal laws against rape
in the United States.
One risk to which a male rapist exposes his female victim is the
possibility of a pregnancy through which she will unwillingly assist him
in producing a child. The right against rape thus also-at least inci-
dentally-protects a right against nonconsensual reproduction.
Choosing not to have sex is therefore, at one level, the exercise of a
reproductive choice with which no one takes serious issue.
It is significant to note, however, that even the right against
rape-particularly as it has historically been defined-does not fully
guard a right to control one's own fertility. Until very recently, for
example, married women could lawfully be compelled by their hus-
bands to have marital intercourse.' Without female access to contra-
I Under the so-called marital rape exemption, "the woman, once married, gives herself
up to her husband, thereby endowing the husband a 'sexual entitlement to his wife."' Kelly C.
Connerton, Comment, The Resurgence of the Marital Rape Exemption: The Victimization of
Teens by Their Statutory Rapists, 61 ALB. L. REV. 237, 246-47 (1997).
This exemption is codified in the Model Penal Code definition of rape, which refers to "[a]
male who has sexual intercourse with a female not his wife" as a predicate to committing the
offense. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 (1962) ("A male who has sexual intercourse with a female
not his wife is guilty of rape if: (a) he compels her to submit by force or by threat of imminent
death, serious bodily injury, extreme pain or kidnapping, to be inflicted on anyone; or (b) he has
substantially impaired her power to appraise or control her conduct by administering or employ-
ing without her knowledge drugs, intoxicants or other means for the purpose of preventing resis-
tance; or (c) the female is unconscious; or (d) the female is less than 10 years old.").
Commentary to the Model Penal Code explains, "[The exemption] avoids [an] unwarranted in-
trusion of the penal law into the life of the family." MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 cmt. 8(c)
(Official Draft & Revised Cmts. 1980).
Since the mid-1970s, twenty-four states and the District of Columbia have abolished the
marital immunity for sexual offenses. Michelle J. Anderson, Marital Immunity, Intimate Rela-
tionships, and Improper Inferences: A New Law on Sexual Offenses by Intimates, 54 HASTINGS
L.J. 1465, 1485 (2003); see also Lauren M. Hayter & Victor Voronov, Domestic Violence and the
State, 8 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 273, 277-78 (2007) ("In other states, there is absolutely no marital
rape exemption. There has been an effort among those opposed to the marital exemption to
push states into following the lead of the majority and completely abolishing any marital rape
exemption.") (no citations provided).
Although the rape laws of most states criminalize spousal rape to a greater or lesser extent,
most states continue to treat spousal rape as less serious than rape by someone other than a
victim's spouse. See Sally F. Goldfarb, Applying the Discrimination Model to Violence Against
Women: Some Reflections on Theory and Practice, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 251.
260 n.45 (2003) ("[D]espite recent reforms, the marital rape exemption continues to exist in
some form in the majority of states.").
"Fifteen states grant marital immunity for sexual offenses unless requirements such as
1584
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ception and abortion, a man could (until a few decades ago) thus force
his wife to have sex without legal consequences and by the same act
force her to bear children she might not want to have. As a result, it
would be most accurate to say that, at least for women, the legal pro-
hibition against rape tended to protect the right to select with whom
one would have children (by deciding whose marriage proposals to
accept) but not necessarily to choose whether or when to have
offspring.
Consistent with this claim-that women held the right to select
their offspring by choosing with whom to have offspring-we find that
at common law, the one way in which a man could still render himself
criminally responsible for the rape of his wife was by forcing her to
have sex with a different man. 2 This "exception" to the marital rape
immunity confirms that a person (or at least a married woman) tradi-
tionally had no right to avoid reproducing with her husband but did
have a right to avoid reproducing with someone else. Even this very
limited and transparently sexist protection corresponds to an under-
standing that every person has the right to determine, in one respect,
which of his or her potential offspring will or will not be born, by
choosing (or choosing to reject) a particular sexual (marital) partner.
Though a married woman's bodily integrity found little protection
prompt complaint, extra force, separation, or divorce are met." Anderson, supra, at 1471-72.
Some states still require force in cases of spousal rape. Morgan Lee Woolley, Marital Rape: A
Unique Blend of Domestic Violence and Non-Marital Rape Issues, 18 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J.
269, 282-84 (2007) ("Mississippi still provides a marital exemption for sexual battery if the
spouses are living together at the time of the incident unless use of force and lack of consent can
be shown."); Hayter & Voronov, supra, at 277 ("In some states, a certain level of violence is
required to be present in order for a spouse to be convicted of rape.") (citing MD. CODE ANN.,
CRIM. LAW § 3-318 (West 2009) ("A person may be prosecuted under [sexual offense provisions]
of this subtitle for a crime against the person's legal spouse if... the person in committing the
crime uses force or threat of force and the act is without the consent of the spouse.") and OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1111 (West 2009) ("Rape is an act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a
male or female who is the spouse of the perpetrator if force or violence is used or threatened,
accompanied by apparent power of execution to the victim or to another person.")).
Prompt reporting is required in four states. Woolley, supra, at 283 ("Four states still require
prompt complaint (usually within three months) for spousal sexual offenses but not for other
rapes. For example, in California, the spouse-victim must report the incident within one year,
but this requirement can be overcome with corroborating independent evidence. In South Caro-
lina, spouse-victims of criminal sexual battery must report the incident within thirty days.").
2 See Jill Elaine Hasday, Contest and Consent: A Legal History of Marital Rape, 88 CAL.
L. REV. 1373, 1403 (2000) (quoting 2 THOMAS W. WATERMAN, A COMPLETE PRACTICAL TREA-
TISE ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 306 (New York, Banks, Gould & Co. 6th ed. 1853) ("A husband
could be found guilty of rape 'as a principal in the second degree,' by assisting another person to
commit a rape upon his wife; for though, in marriage, the wife has given up her body to her
husband, yet he cannot compel her to prostitute herself to another."')).
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against her husband, respect for her OSI explains the narrow case in
which her husband was prohibited from subjecting her to rape.
B. Traditional Sexual Prohibitions
In addition to illuminating the law of rape, the notion of an
OSI-an interest in controlling the composition of our offspring-
helps organize many of the traditional sexual rules that have found
expression in religious communities within the United States and else-
where around the globe.
Consider prohibitions against sexual relations outside of marriage
(adultery), with people to whom one is not married (fornication), with
close relatives (incest), and with people outside the faith or nation
(intermarriage). The English word "adultery" literally suggests an un-
desirable adulteration of a husband-wife line. And the branding of
some children as "illegitimate" implies that these are people who
should never have been brought into being. By observing prohibitions
against these sexual practices, a person thus directly and consciously
alters the composition of future generations by avoiding the creation
of people who would have resulted from the prohibited relationships.
And the observance of these rules is considered not only acceptable
but mandatory within many communities.
C. Arranged Marriage
Consider as well the traditional practice of arranged marriage
(which prevents individuals from choosing a spouse). This practice
ordinarily involves parental interference with children's spousal selec-
tion process and thus might appear to contradict rather than exem-
plify the OSI. Contrary to appearances, however, arranged marriage
paradoxically affirms the value a community places on controlling
who comes into existence. A society, culture, or family might under-
stand its interest in avoiding creation of the "wrong" offspring to be so
important that reproduction cannot be left to the vicissitudes of ro-
mantic love (which may lead to poorly selected mating partners), but
must instead rest within the control of the older and wiser originators
of the reproductive material. Arranged marriages, therefore, retain
with the potential grandparents the right to decide, even after their
children are grown, which potential people will ultimately come into
existence from their lines. A parent who vetoes a child's choice of a
mate is accordingly exercising a (decidedly unmodern) form of repro-
ductive choice.
1586 [Vol. 77:1582
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D. An Interest in Being "Child Free"?
In theory, the person who has a right to decide whom to marry
could find that no one is acceptable and decide not to reproduce at all.
Does this suggest that traditional societies recognize a right to child-
lessness? Not quite.
To link sexuality and reproduction closely, as traditional western
religions do, is necessarily to impose great costs on the individual who
chooses not to have children. If you do not want to have children in
such a system, you can pursue that desire only by forsaking all sexual
contact. Indeed, Judeo-Christian religious injunctions against "spilling
seed" (through masturbation) and forms of sexual union that cannot
produce a child (such as homosexual relations) may well reflect the
"penalty" for childlessness-sexual frustration as the destiny of those
who refuse to reproduce.3
When the Vatican adopted its Humanae Vitae in July of 1968, it
took the position that couples are prohibited from using "artificial"
birth control and that "each and every marital act must of necessity
retain its intrinsic relationship to the procreation of human life."'4
Under Catholic doctrine, then, abstinence is the only legitimate form
of birth control, and the price of sex is the possibility of procreation.
Very few people would be willing to forgo all sexual contact just
to avoid procreation, even if they had a strong preference for child-
lessness. And if we look to Judeo-Christian Biblical commandments
to be fruitful and multiply, we see little to suggest a basic right to
choose not to reproduce at all.5
If we limit ourselves to traditional societies that operate within
the Judeo-Christian model, then, we observe a consensus around the
idea that people who exist in the present have an interest in choosing
the composition of future generations-by marrying a chosen mate or
by selecting a child's mate-and that the individual has not only a
"right" but an affirmative responsibility to avoid giving existence to
people who would result from adulterous, non-marital, and incestuous
relationships as well as from marriages that cross religious or other
cultural boundaries. At the same time, however, we see that tradi-
3 See generally Cardinal Franjo Seper, Persona Humana (1975), available at http://www.
vatican.va/romancurialcongregations/cfaith/documents/rc con cfaith doc 19751229_persona-
humana-en.html (declaration on sexual ethics).
4 Paul VI, Humanae Vitae (1968), available at http://www.vatican.va/holytather/paul-vi/
encyclicals/documents/hf_p-vi enc 25071968_humanae-vitae en.html (encyclical letter on the
regulation of birth).
5 See Genesis 1:28.
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tional Judeo-Christian cultures do not look favorably upon the choice
of childlessness and permit it only at the cost of celibacy.
From pre-modern and some existing religious traditions, one can
thus infer the broadly accepted principle that human beings hold an
OSI-an interest in exercising some control over their reproductive
futures, through choice of (their own or a child's) mate, but that they
hold no right to avoid a reproductive future altogether. On this ap-
proach, the answer to our question about the "rights" of potential
lives is that traditional societies, with values similar to those espoused
by the Catholic Church, do not extend to potential individuals a cogni-
zable interest in coming into existence.
The potential offspring that would result from a union between X
and Y, in other words, might never come into being, because X and Y
do not find each other attractive or because X's parents will not agree
to the marriage of X and Y. No religious or ethical tradition tells us
that X and Y commit a wrong against their potential offspring by not
coming together to produce a child. We have no obligation to bring
into existence (or even to try to create) every possible human being by
every possible combination of egg and sperm cells. Indeed, strict re-
ligious rules of sexual union suggest a much more deliberate and de-
signed set of unions in which diversity of partners is strongly
discouraged. It is possible to lose sight of this widely shared OSI ac-
ceptance if we focus exclusively on rules against "artificial" birth con-
trol and abortion.
E. Modern, Secular Acceptance of the OSI
What are we to take from these traditional approaches? In mod-
ern, enlightened times, we surely must resort to more than a citation
of Christian practice (or a mention of tradition) to justify a position as
a normative matter. It seems, however, that at least one reproduc-
tion-related view survives modern, secular moral thinking and thus
provides for a cross-temporal consensus. It is the view that people do
have an important interest in exercising some control (at least by way
of mate selection) over the form that their offspring and descendants
will take. And at least that modest appreciation for reproductive
rights-captured in the OSI-appears nearly universal.
The modern U.S. constitutional embodiment of this interest finds
expression in the right not to procreate in the substantive due process
protection for contraception, articulated for married couples in Gris-
1588 [Vol. 77:1582
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wold v. Connecticut6 and for unmarried individuals in Eisenstadt v.
Baird.7 These cases together stand for the proposition that people
may do more than simply choose a particular life-partner and thereby
rule out the offspring they would wish to avoid having with other peo-
ple. They may also control reproduction within their chosen
relationships.
From a secular point of view, Griswold and Eisenstadt represent
logical extensions of the undisputed right to avoid unwanted procrea-
tion. 8 Without the notion that God has commanded us to be fruitful9
(but has also ordered us to limit ourselves to one partnerO), there
appears to be no reason to distinguish between a right to avoid
procreating with Y (an undesired mate) and a right to avoid procreat-
ing with anyone, even our chosen soul-mate, at any given time.
Neither the hypothetical children of alternative couplings nor the hy-
pothetical children of the actual couplings that have materialized have
the right to go from being potential people to becoming actual people.
In fact, given the dangers and harms of overpopulation, it is ar-
guably in no one's interest (whether existing in the present or in the
future) to prevent people from voluntarily reducing their own repro-
6 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Although the majority opinion bases the
right to use contraceptives on the "penumbral rights of 'privacy and repose,"' id. at 485, Justice
Harlan's reasoning in his concurring opinion, basing the right on the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, id. at 500, was followed by later courts.
7 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). Describing and extending the right against
procreation first recognized in Griswold, the Court said in Eisenstadt:
If under Griswold the distribution of contraceptives to married persons cannot be
prohibited, a ban on distribution to unmarried persons would be equally impermis-
sible. It is true that in Griswold the right of privacy in question inhered in the
marital relationship. Yet the marital couple is not an independent entity with a
mind and heart of its own, but an association of two individuals each with a sepa-
rate intellectual and emotional makeup. If the right of privacy means anything, it is
the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted govern-
mental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision
whether to bear or beget a child.
Id. at 453.
8 Further embracing the right to avoid unwanted maternity or paternity is the case of
Davis v. Davis, No. E-14496, 1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS 641 (Cir. Ct. Sept. 21, 1989), rev'd, No.
180, 1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS 642 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 1990), affd, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn.
1992), discussed at length at infra Part II.B.
9 Genesis 1:22 ("Be fruitful and multiply, and fill the waters in the seas, and let birds
multiply on the earth.").
10 The seventh of the Ten Commandments states, "Thou shalt not commit adultery." Exo-
dus 20:14; see also Proverbs 6:32 ("But whoever commits adultery with a woman lacks under-
standing: he that does it destroys his own soul."); Matthew 5:27-28 ("You have heard that it was
said, 'You shall not commit adultery;' but I say to you, that everyone who looks on a woman to
lust for her has committed adultery with her already in his heart.").
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ductive contribution to the world to something less than what is physi-
cally possible. To put the point differently, reproductive rights rest on
the legitimate assumption that although there will be people who exist
in the future, we give no right to any of the countless potential people
to become one of those who ultimately have the attribute of
existence."l
F. A Secular Obligation "Concerning" Children
What about a right to have no children at all? Some individuals
and couples decide not to procreate, and such people-even in secular
environments-frequently face negative social consequences. People
often assume that childless individuals are physically unable to have
children. On the basis of this assumption, some might recommend
fertility treatments. If the recommender learns that the couple is
"childless by choice,"'12 however, he or she may not be satisfied with
this revelation. Though it would seem (and in fact be) totalitarian to
compel any individual to have children, the "childless by choice" draw
a stigma that is distinct from that of the infertile-they are viewed by
some as "shirking" their obligations. 13
It is worth asking, "obligations to whom"? Could it be that the
person offering a judgment in this scenario ("Judge") believes that the
childless couple, consisting of X and Y, is violating the interests of
their own potential children by not bringing them into existence? This
seems unlikely, given that no particular offspring of X and Y has a
11 Cf. RENA DESCARTES, MEDITATIONS ON FIRST PHILOSOPHY 137-39 (George Heffernan
ed., Univ. of Notre Dame Press 1990) (1641) (arguing for the existence of God by reference to
our being able to imagine the perfect being, coupled with the claim that a truly perfect being
would have to have the attribute of existence).
12 This phrase represents a term of art currently used to describe those who decide not to
have children and wish to own that decision rather than have it attributed to infertility. There is
a growing literature surrounding the modern phenomenon of "childless by choice." See, e.g.,
JANE BARTLETr, WILL You BE MOTHER?: WOMEN WHO CHOOSE TO SAY No, at ix-xi (1994)
(preferring the term "child-free"); JOAN BRADY, I DON'T NEED A BABY TO BE WHO I AM:
THOUGHTS AND AFFIRMATIONS ON A FULFILLING LIFE, at xi-xvi (1998); ELINOR BURKETT, THE
BABY BOON: How FAMILY-FRIENDLY AMERICA CHEATS THE CHILDLESS 7 (2000); MARDY S.
IRELAND, RECONCEIVING WOMEN: SEPARATING MOTHERHOOD FROM FEMALE IDENTITY, at vii
(1993); CAROLYN M. MORELL, UNWOMANLY CONDUCT: THE CHALLENGES OF INTENTIONAL
CHILDLESSNESS, at xiii (1994); Martha E. Gimenez, Feminism, Pronatalism, and Motherhood, in
MOTHERING: ESSAYS IN FEMINIST THEORY 287, 289 (Joyce Trebilcot ed., 1983) (arguing that
women should not feel forced to have children); Irene Reti, Introduction, in CHILDLESS BY
CHOICE: A FEMINIST ANTHOLOGY 1-3 (Irene Reti ed., 1992); Lisa Belkin, Your Kids Are Their
Problem, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2000 (Magazine), at 30, 33; Enid Nemy, No Children. No Apolo-
gies., N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 1995, at C12.
13 See Nemy, supra note 12.
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right to come into existence (and few would maintain that X and Y
must conceive and give birth to the absolute maximum number of
children they could possibly produce).
More plausibly, Judge believes that X and Y have an obligation to
create and raise upstanding citizens who will join Judge's children in
maintaining and improving the lives of those in their own generation.
Judge therefore sees an obligation to those people in the next genera-
tion who will exist to provide them with fellow citizens with whom to
share the pleasures and burdens of life.1 4 In addition to taking care of
one another and others of the same generation, X's and Y's offspring
could some day help take care of X and Y as well as other members of
X's and Y's generation.
More generally, as one generation ages, it needs a younger popu-
lation to provide for it, whether directly, by taking care of an elderly
parent, or indirectly, by providing the manpower (and womanpower)
to perform the services and produce the goods that the elderly popula-
tion will need but will be unable to produce on its own. One concern
in Japan at the present time is that with such a low rate of reproduc-
tion (far below replacement), there will come a time when-absent
immigration-almost everyone who lives in Japan will be elderly, and
there will be virtually no one to run the economy and provide older
citizens with necessary goods and services.15 This will also have the
effect of creating an extreme burden on the few existing young people
to take care of so many, analogous to the experience of a single parent
who must care for ten children.1 6
14 My colleague Chantal Thomas raised an interesting analogy to parents who decide to
have a second child to provide friendship and companionship (as well as an assistant in later
caring for elderly parents) to the first child.
15 [Japan's] fertility rate (the estimate of the total number of children a woman will
bear in her lifetime) stands at 1.25 .... Demographers suggest that a country needs
a fertility rate of 2.1 to maintain a stable population, balancing deaths with births.
Some might suggest that fewer people would be a good thing, especially on Tokyo's
crowded subways, but absent immigration, low fertility means fewer new workers
to take over for those who retire, fewer people to care for an aging population, and,
perhaps of greatest concern to governments, fewer income earners to pay for social
services and government expenditures through their taxes.
Irene Bloemraad, Citizenship and Pluralism: The Role of Government in a World of Global Mi-
gration, 31 FLETCHER F. WORLD AIF. 169, 171-72 (2007).
16 However, as Michael C. Dorf has suggested, an advanced system of robots could some
day take the place of young people in taking care of the aged. See Caitrin Nicol, Till Malfunction
Do Us Part, NEw ATLANrIS, Winter 2008, at 126 ("Japan-the country with the world's highest
percentage of elderly people and lowest percentage of children-has been at the forefront of this
domestic-robot trend. In 2005, Mitsubishi released its 'Wakamaru' robot to considerable fan-
fare. The three-foot-tall machine, its appearance something like a yellow plastic snowman, was
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We have thus far observed the following uncontroversial, widely
(and intergenerationally) shared intuitions about the morality of re-
productive rights: (a) people have some right to determine their re-
productive futures, including (b) choosing one mate over others. If
one takes a secular approach, these first two intuitions logically extend
to including a right to exercise control over the timing and frequency
of pregnancies.
If one accepts the first two premises, it necessarily follows that
potential people do not have a right to become actual people. None-
theless, those potential people who do become actual people (like the
individuals who already comprise our own generation) have interests
that include the existence of other people in the same generation who
can assist them in caring for themselves and the older generation, and
the existence of a younger generation of people who can assist them in
their own old age.17 To the extent that people in our generation have
an obligation to have children at all, then, this obligation is one that
"concerns" children.18 It is owed not to the potential people whom we
would bring into existence but to other people whose existence lies
completely outside of any particular individual's or couple's control.
And the obligation is to ensure that there are people around; it does
not entail the creation of any specific assortment of people.
designed to provide limited home care to the aged. It can 'recognize' up to ten human faces,
respond to voice commands, deliver e-mail and weather forecasts from the Internet, wheel
around after people in their homes, and contact family members or health care personnel when
it detects a potential problem with its ward."); Shinichi Terada, Robot Development Takes a
Homeward Turn, JAPAN TIMEs, Sept. 23, 2008, at 11 (discussing how as society ages, there will be
a growing market in Japan for home health-care robots); Rhodri Marsden, Tomorrow's World
Today, INDEPENDENT, Aug. 27, 2008, at 8 (describing a robot available in Japan designed prima-
rily to provide company for the elderly). According to one source,
As baby boomers hit retirement age, the need to monitor and assist seniors will
create a surge in demand for personal-care robots, experts say. Since 2001, the
Japanese government has spent $210 million on research to meet its goal of de-
ploying robots to support its aging workforce. (It's [sic] timeline specifies that bots
should be able to straighten a room by the end of this year, make beds by 2013, and
help with baths and meals by 2025.)
Katie Baker, Why Should We Be Friends? As Japan builds a new generation of robot companions,
U.S. firms focus on pragmatics, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 25, 2008, at 30.
17 Note, however, the caveat that if robots could carry out all of the functions that people
now do, it might be morally acceptable for the entire population to stop reproducing. See Nicol,
supra note 16. But cf. WALL-E (Walt Disney Pictures 2008) (implying that a system of robotic
assistance could breed an unhealthy sloth in the human population).
18 Cf. Gary L. Francione, Animals, Property and Legal Welfarism: "Unnecessary" Suffering
and the "Humane" Treatment of Animals, 46 RUTGERS L. REV. 721, 751-52 (1994) (describing
much of the law regarding animals as consisting of obligations that "concern" animals, such as a
prohibition against harming another person's ox, rather than obligations to animals, such as a
prohibition against killing or harming an animal for consumption as food).
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If our obligation is not to any particular potential person to make
sure she comes into existence and not even regarding any particular
person's or people's existence, it is appropriate to consider the obliga-
tion to be one that we owe together, as a group, rather than individu-
ally. It does not matter, on this approach, whether you have no
children, two children, or sixteen children, as long as the sum total of
children created by your generation does not significantly fall short of,
or exceed, the number needed by people who exist now and will exist
in the future. The effort to populate future generations, then, is col-
laborative rather than individual. Indeed, the very fact that there are
such phenomena as "overpopulation" and "underpopulation" under-
scores the importance of viewing reproductive obligations as commu-
nal rather than individual and as dynamic rather than static.1 9 Unlike
the obligation to avoid pollution, our obligations concerning children
are complicated and go in both directions. Coercive programs (in-
tended to "enforce" the obligation either to procreate or not to, at the
individual level) could thus backfire in their outcomes, quite apart
from the human rights abuses inherent in attempts to mandate the
course of an individual's reproductive life. 20
19 One can imagine scenarios in which we perceive a need to increase the number of peo-
ple coming into existence and therefore create incentives for reproduction (including, for exam-
ple, mandatory coverage for fertility medicine, generous parental-leave laws, dependent
deductions, and tax credits for offspring). One can imagine the converse in an environment
understood as overpopulated (including subsidies for birth-control-or distribution of free birth
control-and a failure to provide tax benefits to people with many children). Among those who
criticized the Aid to Families with Dependent Children ("AFDC") system that existed before
President Clinton ended "welfare as we know it" were commentators who suggested that com-
pensating unwed mothers at higher levels for larger numbers of children would perversely moti-
vate them to have more children and thereby maximize their welfare benefits. See Miriam
Galston, Civic Renewal and the Regulation of Nonprofits, 13 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 289,
297 n.27 (2004) ("Some critics have also argued that welfare benefits encouraged the increase in
unwed mothers and fatherless homes. Given the statistical predictions of impoverished life
chances for children raised in single parent homes (all other things being equal), this ripple effect
of welfare benefits, if true, would be among the most destructive consequences of the welfare
state because of its intergenerational consequences."); CHARLES A. MURRAY, LOSING GROUND:
AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY, 1950-1980, at 17-19 (1984). Such concerns were present from the
beginning of the AFDC program. See Susan W. Blank & Barbara B. Blum, A Brief History of
Work Expectations for Welfare Mothers, 7 FUTURE OF CHILD. 28, 30 (1997) (citing J.C. BROWN,
PUBLIC RELIEF 1929-39, at 309 (1940)), available at http://www.princeton.edu/futureofchildren/
publications/docs/07_01_02.pdf ("Concerns about whether the AFDC subsidy inadvertently en-
couraged unwed motherhood arose early on in some states.").
20 For a fascinating treatment of what has ensued when organizations and governments
around the globe have attempted to control reproduction (in both directions), see generally
MAITHEW CONNELLY, FATAL MISCONCEPTION: THE STRUGGLE To CONTROL WORLD POPULA-
TION (2008).
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Considered in this light, our children are, at one level, resources
that will be available to our generation as well as to their respective
generations, to take on responsibilities that might otherwise go unmet
or that might pose an extreme hardship to a small number of people.
The potential resources themselves-the hypothetical children we
might or might not have-however, do not have a cognizable interest
in coming into existence.
A common exchange between teenagers and their parents use-
fully illustrates this idea. The conversation typically takes the follow-
ing form: Mother: "You should be grateful for all of the things your
father and I provide for you." Child: "Why? I never asked to be
born." The implicit message in this exchange is that parents have not
granted any affirmative benefit to the child by bringing her into exis-
tence and that, on the contrary, whatever the parents do for the child
simply fulfills the duty that the parents assume when they create a
person who will be dependent for some period of time. On this ap-
proach, parents owe their children from the very beginning because
they created them (rather than having created them because they owe
them existence).
Though perhaps, in part, a product of teenage narcissism, the idea
captured in this "conversation" is powerful. It is impossible to com-
pare the experience of existing, as our children do, with the experi-
ence of never having come into existence. I can be grateful, then, that
you exist, because your presence enhances my life, but being grateful
that I exist as opposed to never having existed is a somewhat incoher-
ent proposition. Stated differently, we have children for ourselves and
for others who may benefit from our children's existence, but we do
not (and have no obligation to) have children for their own good.
If nonexistent persons lack any right to come into existence, then
who exactly is in a position to make claims on us, the present genera-
tion, and demand that we preserve and create resources for the fu-
ture? One answer is that whether or not any one of us chooses to
reproduce, we can with confidence predict that there will in fact be
people in the future and thus accept the moral proposition that those
people, once they are here, will have as much of a right to fulfill their
own needs as we have to fulfill ours. We therefore project our imagi-
nations into the future and keep that future in mind as we protect the
interests of those who will exist later (but whose composition, as a
population, remains indeterminate at the present time).
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II. Conflation of the OSI with the BII
A second interest that arises in the context of reproductive rights
is the interest in bodily integrity. That is, people who support repro-
ductive rights generally rely not only on the OSI but also on the B1I,
the interest in controlling access to our own bodies. In Planned
Parenthood v. Casey,21 for example, the U.S. Supreme Court identified
the original right to abortion in Roe as arising from the limits on the
government's ability to interfere with "a person's most basic decisions
about family and parenthood, as well as bodily integrity. '2 2 The Court
here invoked first the OSI and second the BII. Yet it felt no need to
separate the two, given that both lines of precedent provide support
for the right at issue. In other words, the Court treated the two inter-
ests together. This makes perfect sense if one is concluding that there
is a right to abortion-both the OSI, the interest in determining
whether or not to give rise to particular offspring, and the BII, the
interest in guarding one's bodily integrity against unwanted occupa-
tion, point in the same direction. It may thus seem unnecessary to
delineate sharply between the two separate interests.
If we consider other examples of a person's interest in bodily in-
tegrity, we see a similar phenomenon. First, consider the right not to
have sex with an undesired partner. This, as described earlier, pro-
tects the OSI because if one must have sex with undesired partners,
one may well be forced to create unwanted children with those part-
ners. The right against unwanted sex is also, however, a significant
expression of the right to bodily integrity. What could be more cen-
tral to bodily integrity than the capacity to exclude unwanted bodies
from inside one's own? Once again, in the case of prohibiting rape,
both the OSI and the BII provide support for the prohibition.
Birth-control functions similarly. Under the OSI, a person has an
interest in avoiding the creation of unwanted offspring. From a secu-
lar point of view, such an interest includes the right to use contracep-
tion. In addition, however, the BII includes a right to prevent sperm
cells from leaving (in the case of a man) or entering (in the case of a
woman) one's body. Again, we see the OSI and the BI pointing in the
same direction. Is it therefore truly a problem to conflate the OSI and
the BII, given that they so frequently operate together to ground vari-
ous interests?
21 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
22 Id. at 849 (internal citations omitted).
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The answer is yes. Though they often coincide, they do not inva-
riably do so. When they do not, moreover, it is important to identify
which interests are at stake if one is to make an informed decision
about a proposed right. Mischief can result from a failure to distin-
guish the two interests from each other.
Consider again the case of rape law. Historically, it is no doubt
true that the right against rape was very much tied to the OSI. After
all, women were not understood to enjoy much of a bodily integrity
interest. That is clear from their husbands' unfettered sexual access to
them.23 In modern times, however, the right against rape is much
more appropriately considered a right concerning the BII. The crime
of rape is not, for example, more serious when its victim is a fertile
woman rather than an infertile woman. Neither is it more serious
when its perpetrator is a fertile man than when he is an infertile man.
Indeed, though gradations of rape in the law continue to reflect sexist
ideology, 24 they do not differ on the basis of whether or not a child
is-or is likely to be-conceived in the process. It is therefore useful
to distinguish between the OSI and the BII in the case of rape, be-
cause the distinction illuminates the changing perception of what
makes the crime harmful.
Consider now some variations on the right to abortion, that make
clear the need to separate the OSI from the BII.
A. Abortion Conflicts
In life as we know it, a pregnant woman in the United States is
legally entitled to terminate her pregnancy, even if the man who in-
seminated her does not want her to have an abortion. In Casey, in
fact, the one portion of Pennsylvania's abortion regulation that failed
to survive the Supreme Court's "undue burden" standard was the hus-
band-notification provision.25 The Court held that compelling a wo-
man to notify her husband prior to obtaining an abortion would pose
an unconstitutional obstacle in the path of women seeking abortions.26
23 See supra note 1.
24 See supra note 1 (discussion of how certain states still treat rape between married indi-
viduals differently); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.373 (2007) (marriage is a defense to a charge of
sexual assault, unless the assault involved force or threat of force); cf DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BU-
REAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS. CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 2006 STATISTI-
CAL TABLES, at tbls.43 & 43a (2006). available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/
cvus06O2.pdf (showing that 68.9% of female victims were raped by nonstrangers and that 10.5%
of single-offender rapes were committed by the victim's spouse).
25 Casey, 505 U.S. at 895.
26 Id. at 895-97.
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By the same token, a man may not compel a woman whom he has
impregnated to terminate her pregnancy against her will. In fact, the
latter proposition highlights one of the few areas of absolute overlap
between those who believe abortion is constitutionally protected and
those who do not: opposition to coerced abortions.27
If one views both contraception and abortion as rights that draw
equally on the OSI and the BII, however, it might seem unfair that
women win, regardless of whether they want to keep or terminate a
pregnancy. The man, on the other hand, loses, whether or not his
choice would be to have the child. The reason that the woman wins in
both cases, however, is that the BII almost always trumps the OSI.
The man has already had sex with the woman and impregnated her, so
he does not stand to suffer any further loss of bodily integrity. His
only remaining interest is therefore the OSI. The woman, however,
relies on the BI to defend her decision whether to remain pregnant
or to terminate her pregnancy. It is only by disentangling the two in-
terests that we can make sense of this result and respond to critics who
charge sex discrimination in not extending the same rights to men
(whether it is the right to terminate, as Michael Newdow has implicitly
defended,28 or the right to keep the child that pro-life men and their
supporters have claimed). The right of abortion is premised much less
on the OSI than on the BII.
B. Embryos Outside the Womb
Consider now the case of contraception. As we have discussed,
the right to contraception implicates both the OSI and the BIL, but
there are cases that resemble contraception that quite clearly do not
implicate both interests.
In frozen-embryo cases decided until now, many courts have priv-
ileged the right not to procreate, as this right is explicated in Gris-
wold29 and Roe.30 The problem with such reliance, however, is that
27 See id. at 980 n.1 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("There is, of course, no comparable tradition
barring recognition of a "liberty interest" in carrying one's child to term free from state efforts to
kill it. For that reason, it does not follow that the Constitution does not protect childbirth simply
because it does not protect abortion. The Court's contention, ante, [505 U.S.] at 859. that the
only way to protect childbirth is to protect abortion shows the utter bankruptcy of constitutional
analysis deprived of tradition as a validating factor. It drives one to say that the only way to
protect the right to eat is to acknowledge the constitutional right to starve oneself to death.").
28 Sherry F. Colb, Should Men Have the Right to a "Financial Abortion"? A Biological
Father Cries Sex Discrimination when Forced to Pay Child Support for an Unwanted Baby, FIN-
DLAw, Mar. 21, 2006, http:llwrit.news.findlaw.com/colb/20060321.html (referring to Susan Domi-
nus, The Fathers' Crusade, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2005 (Magazine), at 26).
29 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
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the BII-an important part of the right to contraception or abortion-
has little or no role to play in resolving frozen-embryo controversies.
When two people decide to create frozen embryos for later im-
plantation, they also create the potential for later conflict. If the
couple splits up, for example, one member might still want to implant
the embryos while the other would prefer not to have children in the
world that belong to the defunct couple. 31 How should such disputes
be resolved?
The first thing to note is that only one of the two reproduction-
related interests has relevance to such a dispute: the OSI. One of the
parents wants to have a child and is willing to and interested in pursu-
ing implantation. The other does not want a child but will suffer no
bodily integrity loss either way. The OSI is an interest in determining
which children one will and will not have and thus applies to both the
party that wants implantation to occur and the party that does not.
There is therefore no a priori reason to prefer the woman over the
man in this situation, in the way that there was in the case of continu-
ing versus terminating a pregnancy. And there is, by the same token,
no reason to privilege the party that wants to avoid reproduction over
the party that wants to pursue it, as there might be in the case of
contraception.
Some cases appear to acknowledge the unusual equality of party
interests in the case of frozen embryos, holding that the parties should
accordingly be bound by whatever agreement they made at the time
of embryo creation. 32 Other cases, however, either aim for consensus
(and privilege the status quo of no implantation) or privilege the right
not to procreate over the right to procreate. This last approach rests
on the view that frozen-embryo cases are like contraception cases, in
which the Court protects the right not to procreate, a right with both
OSI and BII components. Rarely, by contrast, is the Court called on
30 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
31 See A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1053 (Mass. 2000).
32 E.g., J.B. v. M.B.. 783 A.2d 707, 719 (N.J. 2001); Litowitz v. Litowitz, 48 P.3d 261,
270-71 (Wash. 2002); see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.17 (West 2005) (mandating that couples
sign contracts indicating their preferences for disposition of frozen embryos in the event of di-
vorce and providing that in the absence of such contracts, the couple must jointly determine the
disposition of embryos); Jessica L. Lambert, Note, Developing a Legal Framework for Resolving
Disputes Between "Adoptive Parents" of Frozen Embryos: A Comparison to Resolutions of Di-
vorce Disputes Between Progenitors, 49 B.C. L. REv. 529, 542-45, 555 (2008) (discussing the
above statute and cases). But see A.Z. v. B.Z.. 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1057-58 (Mass. 2000) (holding
that it would be against public policy to enforce a contract requiring someone to become a
parent against his or her will).
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to protect the right to procreate. 33 Even privileging the status quo (of
no implantation) implicitly treats the situation as though it mirrors a
case of contraception.
When an embryo already exists, however, the case is quite differ-
ent from what it would be if one member of a couple wanted to con-
ceive a child and the other did not (and in which the one that did not
would have the right to use contraception). Because there is no BII at
stake, it "stacks the deck" to rely decisively on case law that directly
involves the BII. Similarly, the refusal to permit implantation is the
obvious answer only if we ignore the OSI of the party favoring im-
plantation and attend exclusively to the OSI of the party opposing it.
It is, in other words, questionable to select non-implantation as the
default outcome, because the OSI-the only basis on which either
party can rely in a frozen-embryo dispute-is a right to decide whether
to maintain the status quo or whether to change it by having a child.
If one wishes to favor the right not to procreate over the right to pro-
create, one must be careful to articulate a reason for that choice. By
conflating the OSI and the BII, however, it is far too easy to believe
that such a decision arises logically out of the Supreme Court's prece-
dents regarding contraception and abortion. In reality, the Supreme
Court has never decided a case that definitively resolves such frozen-
embryo disputes.
In Davis v. Davis,34 a frozen-embryo case that I discussed in de-
tail elsewhere, 35 the trial court took an approach that reveals an alter-
native path one might take in response to the vanishing BII in such
cases: the path of treating the embryo as a person.3 6 If one cannot
invoke the BI to oppose implantation of a frozen embryo in the other
party, which we have seen one cannot do, then the OSI is all that is
left. But the OSI, when invoked by a person who does not want chil-
dren, is specifically an interest in preventing the creation of people
whom the individual (or group) does not wish to create. If an embryo
is simply reproductive material-mere "potential people"-then it en-
joys no greater interest in coming into existence than the countless
33 But see Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 535 (1942) (involving forced sterilization as
a punishment for crime, which also implicates both the OSI and the BII (in part because of the
surgical process involved)).
34 Davis v. Davis ("Davis I"), No. E-14496, 1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS 641 (Cir. Ct. Sept. 21,
1989), rev'd, No. 180, 1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS 642 (Ct. App. Sept. 13, 1990), affd, 842 S.W.2d
588 (Tenn. 1992).
35 Sherry F. Colb, Words that Deny, Devalue, and Punish: Judicial Responses to Fetus-
Envy, 72 B.U. L. REV. 101, 117-25 (1992).
36 See Davis 1, 1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS 641 at *13.
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other "potential people" whom we choose not to create. On the other
hand, if an embryo is a person already, then one cannot deploy the
OSI to block implantation in a willing party. The OSI expires, in
other words, at the point of personhood, when one is no longer seek-
ing to "prevent" but instead to "kill." The OSI, an interest in control-
ling our genetic legacy, does not entitle us to kill our children.
The couple in Davis divorced after having created frozen em-
bryos together by the process of in vitro fertilization.37 After their
divorce, the man remarried, but his ex-wife still wanted to implant the
embryos that she and her ex-husband had created together.38 Her ex-
husband strenuously objected, arguing his right not to procreate
against his will. 39
The trial court decided to allow the woman to implant the em-
bryos, stating that she would make the better custodial parent because
she had a uterus that she planned to use to "house" the embryos,
while her ex-husband lacked any such suitable "home" for them.40 Al-
though a fetus is not a person under Supreme Court precedent, 41 the
trial court's rhetoric nonetheless implicitly accepted the view that an
embryo is already an entity with interests and that its interest in sur-
vival militates in favor of ruling for the woman who plans its implanta-
tion rather than for the man who plans its destruction n2 With this
approach, if the preferences were reversed and the man wanted his
new wife to implant the embryos but his ex-wife objected, the court
would presumably have taken the man's position-the embryos' inter-
ests are better served by implantation than by destruction.
If we accepted the view that an embryo is a person, entitled to the
same protection as any other person, then the trial court's resolution
of the issue would have made the most sense. The battle would then
be one over whether to save the life of the embryo (as the aspiring
implanter wished to do) or whether to refuse to save the life of the
embryo (as the implanter's opponent wanted to do). With neither an
37 Davis 1, 1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS 641, at *5-6.
38 Id. at *36-37. By the time the Tennessee appellate court considered the case, the appel-
lee had remarried and no longer wished to have the embryos implanted in her. Davis v. Davis,
("Davis 11"), 1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS 642, at *1 n.1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 1990) ("[H]er
intention should the Court uphold the lower court's judgment is not to implant the embryos, and
she wants authority to donate the embryos so that another childless couple may use them.").
39 Davis 1, 1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS 641, at *36-37.
40 Id.
41 Davis 11, 1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS 642, at *7 ("Without live birth, the Supreme Court has
said, a fetus is not a 'person' within the meaning of the statute.").
42 Davis 1, 1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS 641, at *36-37.
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OSI nor a BII to arm the opposing parties, the best interests of the
"child" would be decisive, and-except perhaps in extreme cases-
rescue better serves the "child's" interests than a refusal to rescue.
On appeal, in both the appellate court and the Supreme Court of
Tennessee, the judges rejected the notion that the embryo's "best in-
terests" ought to count (any more, I would add, than another potential
person's "interest" in coming into existence should count in such a
dispute). Instead, the courts viewed the embryo as reproductive ma-
terial and accordingly focused on the competing OSIs of the two par-
ties, the woman and the man.43 Both courts concluded that the man's
interest in avoiding parenthood trumped the woman's interest in pur-
suing it.44 If the embryo were a person, then this resolution would
have been unacceptable.
C. Abortion Assumptions
In addition to clarifying what is truly at stake (and thus forcing us
to make authentic arguments) in the case of conflicts between parties
over abortion or frozen embryos, the conflation of the OSI and the
BI1 helps explain the pro-life assumption that the abortion contro-
versy can be resolved simply be determining when life begins.
Those who describe themselves as "pro-life" take the position
that a person has come into existence (with all of the entitlements this
entails, including the right to continue existing) at the moment of con-
ception.45 On the pro-life view, neither an egg cell nor a sperm cell
exists yet-considered either individually or together-as a person
with rights, but once the two combine to form a zygote, we now have a
person with interests.46 It is on the basis of this initial premise that
pro-life advocates oppose not only abortion (the termination of an
extant pregnancy after implantation) but also intra-uterine devices
("IUD's"), which interfere with implantation after fertilization, and
the "morning-after pill," which can do the same.47 Use of these proce-
43 See Davis 11, 1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS 642, at *7-9; Davis v. Davis ("Davis HIr), 842
S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992).
44 See Davis 11, 1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS 642, at *9; Davis 111, 842 S.W.2d at 604.
45 See, e.g., National Right to Life, When Does Life Begin?, http://www.nrlc.org/abortion/
wdlb/wdlb.html (last visited July 26, 2009) ("A new individual human being begins at fertiliza-
tion, when the sperm and ovum meet to form a single cell.").
46 Id. For an excellent challenge to the moral distinction between egg and sperm, on the
one hand, and zygote, on the other, see PETER SINGER & DEANE WELLS, MAKING BABIES: THE
NEW SCIENCE AND ETHICS OF CONCETION 74-75 (1985) (disputing that embryos have rights).
47 A Department of Health and Human Services proposed rule, for instance, would have
broadly defined abortion as any procedure that terminates the life of a fertilized egg in utero,
even before implantation occurs. Brian Todd, Plan Calls Pill, JUDs Abortion, CNN.coM, Sept.
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dures and medications deliberately terminates the life of any zygote
that might come along and therefore, in the eyes of the pro-life ob-
server, constitutes an abortion.48 For similar reasons, members of the
pro-life movement oppose embryonic stem-cell research, because it
involves the destruction and use of cells that qualify as persons under
their definition of personhood. 49
In the case of frozen-embryo disputes, as we saw above, the view
that a person exists from the moment of conception necessarily leads
to the selection of the parent who wishes to implant an embryo over
the parent who wishes to destroy it. In such cases, if an embryo is a
"person," there is no OSI, and a pro-life individual can forcefully op-
pose assertion of a right "not to procreate" in such circumstances, pro-
vided he can convince the decisionmaker of his view of the embryo's
status. Similarly, embryonic stem cell experimentation would be im-
proper, no matter how many lives it might save, if it involved the de-
struction of an actual living person for the sole purpose of advancing
the search for medical knowledge.
The pro-life theorist makes a questionable inferential leap, how-
ever, when she concludes that if the embryo is a full human being,
then it must be the case that IUDs, the morning-after pill, and abor-
tion are and ought to be treated as murder. To assume that abortion is
tantamount to murder if the embryo is already a person is to believe
that just because the OSI has expired (due to the graduation of a "po-
tential person" to personhood), the BII has necessarily expired as
well. That is, one must say more than that an embryo is a person as a
prelude to pressing the view that abortion should be criminalized and
doctors who perform them subjected to harsh penalties.50 The failure
to note the gap between fetal personhood, on the one hand, and the
25, 2008, http://www.cnn.com/video/#/video/us/2008/08/01/todd.defining.abortion.cnn?
iref=videosearch (discussing the potential implications of a "conscience" provision allowing
health care workers to opt out of assisting with any procedure that could terminate the life of a
fertilized egg in utero, prior to or after implantation); Ensuring That Department of Health and
Human Services Funds Do Not Support Coercive or Discriminatory Policies or Practices In Vio-
lation of Federal Law, 73 Fed. Reg. 78,072, 78,077 (Dec. 19, 2008) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt.
88) (responding to comments to proposed rule, 73 Fed. Reg. 50,274 (Aug. 26, 2008), by declining
to adopt a definition).
48 See Todd, supra note 47.
49 See, e.g., National Right to Life, Killing Human Embryos, http://www.nrlc.org/kiling_
embryos/index.html (last visited July 25, 2009).
50 At least in the United States, pro-life advocates tend to oppose direct prosecution of the
women obtaining abortions but seek instead to limit criminalization to providers. See Emily
Blistein, Revisiting Roe: The Language of Privacy and Isolation in U.S. and Vermont Case Law,
VT. B.J., Spring 2008, at 2; Feminists For Life of America. Frequently Asked Questions, http://
www.feministsforlife.org/FAQ/index.htm#criminalize (last visited July 25, 2009); Sherry F. Colb,
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propriety of classifying abortion as murder, on the other, reflects a
conflation of the OSI (which rightly drops out of the equation at the
point of personhood) and the BII.
Pro-life advocates are not the only ones to conflate the OSI and
the BII in thinking about the legality of abortion. The pro-choice
community has tended to argue against the view that in the course of a
pregnancy, a "person" has at some point come into existence, on the
apparent assumption that personhood negates the right to abortion.
Yet it is difficult to imagine that many pro-choice advocates seriously
believe that a woman about to give birth is carrying an entity with no
moral status. More likely, if one accepts a right to an abortion until
the very end of pregnancy, one rests-at least at the end-on notions
of self-defense rather than a commitment to the fetus's non-
personhood.
Pro-choice theorists are on firmer ground when they argue that
terminating a very early pregnancy does not end the life of a person.
By contrast to a late-term fetus, a zygote or embryo does not appear
to most secular theorists to share any of the relevant characteristics of
personhood. 51 That is, if one asks the question "why does anyone
have rights?" the answer cannot be "because he or she has human
DNA." To invoke DNA is to provide a tautological response, not a
moral argument. Yet it is only human DNA and its potential that dis-
tinguishes a human zygote from an amoeba.52 Presumably, most peo-
ple would invoke human capacities rather than membership in the
human species when arguing that we ought to have rights: perhaps the
capacity to feel pain and sorrow and the capacity to feel love and plea-
sure. The embryo lacks any of these capacities. It is either one cell or
a group of relatively undifferentiated cells.5 3
But if it is difficult to defend the personhood of a zygote or em-
bryo-other than by tautological invocations of the fact that it is a
human because it is not a zebra or a moose, 54 it is equally difficult to
Who Wants to Imprison Pregnant Women for Having Abortions?: Not Necessarily the Pro-Life
Community, FINDLAW, Aug. 22, 2007, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/colb/20070822.html.
51 See SINGER & WELLS, supra note 46, at 74-75.
52 Cf. id. at 74 (making the same type of comparison to a tadpole).
53 See id. at 74.
54 See Sherry F. Colb, The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Approves An "In-
formed Consent" Requirement for Abortions: The Slippery Quality of Statutory Definitions, FIN-
DLAw, June 9, 2008, http://writ.news.fmdlaw.com/colb/20080709.html (criticizing a South Dakota
law requiring a doctor to inform a pregnant woman "that the abortion will terminate the life of a
whole, separate, unique, living human being" and then defining "human being" as "an individual
living member of the species of Homo sapiens, including the unborn human being during the
entire embryonic and fetal ages from fertilization to full gestation").
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defend the non-personhood of the fetus just prior to birth. This fetus
shares virtually all the characteristics of a newborn baby, save the abil-
ity to breathe air, which, like the possession of human DNA, is not
relevant to any judgment about one's moral entitlement to the rights
accompanying personhood.
We see here that line-drawing-in this as in other contexts-nec-
essarily seems arbitrary at the boundaries. In the abortion debate,
however, one can take the pro-choice position without having to draw
either line, by relying firmly on the BI. If women could, on the other
hand, terminate their pregnancies without terminating the lives of fe-
tuses, the need to draw lines would become more pressing, difficult as
it might be. One could no longer say, as Casey did, that a pregnant
woman may decide for herself when she believes life begins. 55 That
only makes sense if the life in question is posing a threat to the wo-
man's bodily integrity. Once it no longer is, because it lives inside an
artificial womb, the woman is no more entitled to determine when
that life begins than is the sperm donor or, for that matter, the rest of
US.
Many understand personhood to begin well before the end of
nine months post-conception. Reactions to late-term abortions-in-
cluding strong approval ratings for so-called "partial-birth abortion"
legislation-suggest that by the third and perhaps even the second tri-
mester of pregnancy, people believe there to be an entity with inter-
ests at stake. 56
Another datum from which to infer people's sense of a fetus's
entitlements is the passage of legislation that treats as murder (in cer-
tain circumstances) a nonconsensual assault on a pregnant woman
that results in the death of her fetus. 57 I have elsewhere argued that as
long as a woman is willing to carry her pregnancy to term, "viability"
should be understood to occur-for purposes of a third party's at-
tack-as early as conception. 58 Viability, after all, refers to the capac-
55 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) ("At the heart of
liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of
the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of per-
sonhood were they formed under compulsion of the State.").
56 To respond to bodily integrity concerns, if one is inclined to prohibit late abortions, one
could in theory invoke the failure to terminate at an earlier point, although such arguments are,
in theory, susceptible of extension back to the failure to use birth control or to abstain.
57 Thirty-five states have such laws. National Right to Life, State Homicide Laws That
Recognize Unborn Victims, available at http://www.nrlc.orglUnborn_Victims/Statehomicide
laws092302.html (last visited July 25, 2009).
58 Sherry F. Colb, Is Killing an Undiscovered First-Trimester Fetus Murder in California?
The Answer Probably Is, and Should Be, "Yes," FINDLAw, Jan. 28, 2004, http://writ.news.findlaw.
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ity to continue to live without compelling anyone's sacrifice of bodily
integrity. One could therefore decide to define even an embryo, if
wanted by its mother, as viable with respect to other people. On this
theory, however, one could also define a container of live sperm and a
nearby container of ova as a person (or as many people), if there are
willing parents prepared to implant and gestate the union of those
sperm and ova. In the event of a conflict, it might therefore (on re-
flection) be more sensible to draw the line at a point that actually
coincides with an entity's acquisition of interests and entitlements
rather than at viability, however defined.
Laws that classify third-party assaults on pregnant women that
result in the death of the fetus as homicide, sometimes require that the
fetus have reached a particular stage.59 This suggests that even when a
zygote's existence does not threaten anyone's bodily integrity, a large
sector of the population does not believe that its life as a person be-
gins at conception. At the same time, however, the prevalence of fe-
tal-homicide laws throughout the country represents some evidence of
a widely shared view that a person's life begins sometime prior to
birth, perhaps long before birth. That is, in part, why abortion re-
mains a vexing and painful issue rather than one which is subject to a
self-evident answer that everyone can easily accept. With an artificial
womb, one aspect of the problem-the direct conflict between a fe-
tus's life and a woman's bodily integrity-would virtually disappear,
only for another-the status of the disconnected but live fetus at vari-
ous stages of development-to become salient and inescapable. 60
Until that time, however, members of both the pro-choice and
pro-life communities should recognize that their respective stands on
fetal personhood are either unnecessary (in the case of the pro-choice
perspective) or insufficient (in the case of the pro-life perspective) to
the task of defining the moral status of abortion. The belief that fetal
personhood is incompatible with abortion rights is based on the con-
com/colb/20040128.html (arguing that "a fetus whose mother is going to stay pregnant is as 'via-
ble' against the mother's assailant as the truly viable fetus is against a woman who seeks a late
term abortion").
59 Ten states have laws that require the pregnancy to have progressed beyond a particular
point before the death of the fetus will qualify as a homicide. National Right to Life, supra note
57.
60 Another example of maternal-fetal conflict that does not necessarily reflect a view
about the personhood of the fetus arises in the case of fetal-protection legislation (punishing
women who give birth to a child after having ingested substances harmful to babies). Wis. STAT.
ANN. §§ 48.193, .205 (West 2009); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-20A-63 (2008). For further discus-
sion, see infra Part IV.C.
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flation of the OSI, which cannot provide support for a right to kill a
full person, with the BII, which might well support the choice to ter-
minate a pregnancy.
III. Consensus on the BII and Abortion
We have observed the conflation of the OSI and the BII and the
various contexts in which this conflation prevents us from properly
and thoroughly analyzing difficult cases. Partner conflicts over abor-
tion and over frozen-embryo implantation represent two such con-
texts. The debate over the morality and legality of abortion more
generally revealed a similar conflation, which led to an assumption
that the OSI and the BII necessarily coincide and that when the OSI
disappears, so then must the BII.
Perhaps in part because of such conflation, people who debate
about abortion have failed to see a startling consensus among both
pro-life and pro-choice theorists in the U.S. about the importance of
the BII and, specifically, its central role in understanding pregnancy.
Proponents and opponents of a right to abortion have not only missed
the significance of the BII in grounding a right to abortion, leading to
bizarre and unnecessary fights over third-party fetal-homicide law.
They have also missed the reality that they both largely embrace a
vision of a woman's bodily integrity-as it is compromised by a preg-
nancy-that is the fundamental foundation of a right to abortion.
Readers will likely wonder whether I can possibly be serious in
asserting that pro-life and pro-choice theorists agree at all about the
BI1 and pregnancy. To appreciate the degree of consensus, we turn
now to the "life of the mother" exception to bans on abortion.
Although pro-life advocates view the embryo as a full person,
many nonetheless accept the legitimacy of a "life of the mother" ex-
ception to the criminal bans on abortion that they propose.61 In one
respect, such a concession seems quite modest. Unlike those who
61 See Sherry F. Colb, Abortion, Sarah Palin's Amniocentesis, and the Pro-Life View of Sex,
FINDLAw, Sept. 15, 2008, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/colb/20080915.html (assessing the argu-
ment that taking the risk of pregnancy, by having sex, constitutes consent to pregnancy and
birth); Sherry F. Colb, What Proponents of the "Rape Exception" Teach Us About Abortion,
FINDLAw, July 11, 2007, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/colb/20070711.html (discussing the "life of
the mother" exception to proposed abortion bans). I thank Walter Weber of the American
Center for Law and Justice for e-mail correspondences in which he clarified that he, at least,
does not believe that one may directly kill a fetus to save its mother's life but that he does allow
for the possibility that it may be acceptable to remove a live (but nonviable) fetus or embryo
from a woman, where pregnancy threatens the woman's life, even though removal will necessa-
rily result in fetal death.
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stand firmly in the pro-choice camp and believe that a woman ought
to have a nearly-unfettered right to terminate a pregnancy for any rea-
son, the "life of the mother" concession provides only that a woman
who will die without an abortion need not remain pregnant. In what
respect can the two approaches be said to share a common premise,
apart from the fact that those who believe abortion should always be
permissible would obviously agree that a woman whose pregnancy
threatens her life should have the option of terminating it?
Yet the two views share a central premise. The position that a
woman may justifiably terminate a pregnancy to save her own life
concretely exposes the assumption that, at some level, pregnancy is
something that a fetus does to its mother, something against which the
mother must-at least in extreme cases-be allowed to defend
herself.
To see that this premise-that a fetus, by developing inside a wo-
man, does something to the woman-is implicit in the "life of the
mother" exception, consider a different sort of case. This time, a
mother who is separate from her child can survive only if she kills that
child. Perhaps, for example, the mother needs a vital organ that only
her child can provide. Or perhaps a third party is threatening to kill
the mother if she does not kill her own child. In these cases, where a
non-pregnant woman can survive only by killing her child, it is clear
that she nonetheless may not justifiably do So. 62 Even to preserve our
own lives, we do not have the right to kill others, unless those others
are somehow threatening our lives. That is, we may justifiably kill in
self-defense those who pose a threat of grave harm to us, but we may
not kill those who pose no threat but whose death would help us sur-
vive. We might describe the distinction between such cases as that
between repelling threats, on the one hand, and using another's life as
a mere resource, on the other.
To view an abortion that would save a mother's life as justifiable
self-preservation, notwithstanding the full personhood of the embryo
or fetus, is to accept that the embryo or fetus "threatens" the woman's
life. The fetus does not occupy the status of simply co-existing with
the woman but rather acts upon her in a manner that could, in appro-
priate circumstances, justify defensive aggression.
62 In some states, MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 279, § 69 (LexisNexis 2002), 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 9711 (West 2009), one can invoke a duress defense after killing an innocent person in
response to a threat by a third party. Such a defense is not, however, a justification but rather
falls into the category of an excuse. And indeed, most states do not even allow this excuse for
homicide. 22 CJ.S. Criminal Law § 59 (2009).
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To see this logic explicitly employed, consider the approach of
Jewish law to abortion. Within traditional Jewish doctrine, the Tal-
mud-the crucial "oral tradition" that accompanies the "written law"
to comprise the fundamentals of Jewish observance-does not con-
sider a fetus to be a full person.63 Nonetheless, Moses Maimonides, an
important Twelfth Century thinker and commentator on Jewish law,
did not rely on a rejection of fetal personhood to determine the
proper scope of permissible abortion to save a mother's life. Instead,
he viewed the fetus in such a case as an aggressor against the life of
the mother (in Hebrew, "rodef," one who pursues) and believed that
the mother has a right to repel that aggression.64
It may sound odd to call an abortion "self-defense," given that an
embryo or fetus, unlike the ordinary aggressor against a person's life,
cannot be described as "culpable" in any way. To the extent that its
actions threaten the life of its mother, the threat is a non-responsible
or "innocent" one. In law and in moral philosophy, however, it is
widely accepted that the justification of self-defense does not depend
on the guilt or culpability of the "attacker."
Consider George Fletcher's (and now also Luis Chiesa's) scena-
rio of the psychotic aggressor. 65 In the scenario, a psychotic aggressor
who is, by hypothesis, innocent of any wrongdoing, initiates a lethal
attack against an (utterly) innocent person.66 The question is whether
the person under attack has the right to kill the psychotic aggressor in
63 See DAVID FELDMAN, BIRTH CONTROL IN JEWISH LAW 254-55 (1968); Dena S. Davis,
Method in Jewish Bioethics: An Overview, 20 J. CoNTEMP. L. 325, 335 n.50 (1994) ("A fetus is not
a human being (nefesh) in Jewish law."); Daniel Eisenberg, Stem Cell Research in Jewish Law,
JEWISH LAW, 2001, http://jlaw.com/Articleslstemcellres.html ("To gain a clear understanding of
when abortion is sanctioned, or even required, and when it is forbidden, requires an appreciation
of certain nuances of halacha (Jewish law) which govern the status of the fetus. The easiest way
to conceptualize a fetus in halacha is to imagine it as a full-fledged human being-but not quite.
In most circumstances, the fetus is treated like any other 'person.' Generally, one may not delib-
erately harm a fetus, and sanctions are placed upon those who purposefully cause a woman to
miscarry. However, when its life comes into direct conflict with an already born person, the
autonomous person's life takes precedence.").
64 See THE CODE OF MAIMONIDES: THE BOOK OF TORTS 196-97 (Julian Obermann ed.,
Hyman Klen trans., Yale Univ. Press 1954).
65 George P. Fletcher, Proportionality and the Psychotic Aggressor A Vignette in Compar-
ative Criminal Theory, 8 ISRAEL L. REV. 367, 371 (1973); see also George P Fletcher & Luis E.
Chiesa, Self-Defense and the Psychotic Aggressor, in CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS (Paul H.
Robinson ed., 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1157614.
66 The hypothetical example reads:
Imagine that your companion in an elevator goes berserk and attacks you with a
knife. There is no escape: the only way to avoid serious bodily harm or even death
is to kill him. The assailant acts purposively in the sense that his means further his
aggressive end. He does not act in a frenzy or in a fit, yet it is clear that his conduct
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self-defense. Fletcher (and now Chiesa) argue that he does have such
a right, despite the fact that the aggressor is not criminally responsible
for the threat he poses to the life of his would-be victim. 67 The right
rests on a vision of personal autonomy and bodily integrity on the part
of the person who is threatened. One could understand an embryo or
fetus inside its mother's womb, threatening her life, as analogous to
the psychotic aggressor.68
Now change the scenario. Instead of the psychotic aggressor
threatening the victim's life, he instead threatens the victim's bodily
integrity. 69 Even if we assume that the attacker is both an innocent
and a full moral person, one could maintain that each and every per-
son is entitled to protect her bodily integrity from invasion by another
person and that this entitlement includes the right to expel the inno-
cent aggressor who has occupied the body of another person. This is
true even when such expulsion will inevitably cause the innocent ag-
gressor's death.
In the abortion context, the fetus is the innocent aggressor.
Through no fault of its own, it now occupies the body of the unwill-
ingly pregnant woman. Whether or not it is a "person" (by contrast to
the separated sperm and egg, which everyone agrees are not a person
or persons), the woman may thus be entitled to expel it from her
uterus. At the present time, it is generally impossible to expel the
fetus, prior to viability, without also terminating its life. Therefore, it
may be permissible to terminate a person's life in this case.
If this seems an unwarranted extension of the narrow "life of the
mother" exception, note that self-defense law-at least in the U.S.-
does not draw a line between "death" and "substantial bodily harm"
in allowing a threatened individual to defend herself. The law of vir-
is non-responsible. If he were brought to trial for his attack, he would have a valid
defence of insanity.
See Fletcher, supra note 65, at 371.
67 Id. at 371-80.
68 Although Fletcher and Chiesa suggest that the innocent aggressor must harbor some
moral responsibility for his "acts" to trigger a right of self-defense, I dispute this claim in my own
response to the Fletcher/Chiesa text and argue that the distinction fails to reflect shared intu-
itions about legitimate self-defense. See Sherry F. Colb, Justifying Homicide Against Innocent
Aggressors Without Denying Their Innocence, in CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATnoNs (Paul H.
Robinson ed., 2009), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/cflfaculty/phrobins/conversations/
status/.
69 In Judith Jarvis Thompson's famous example, a gifted violinist who needs to use some-
one else's kidney for nine months has been surgically connected (through no fault of her own) to
a non-consenting donor. See Judith Jarvis Thompson, A Defense of Abortion, 1 PHIL. & PUB.
AF'. 47, 48-49 (1971).
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tually every state, for example, permits a person who is facing an im-
minent rape to respond with deadly force. 70 This is true even if the
victim does not fear for her life and even though the punishment for
rape may not include the death penalty.71 One's justifiable use of
force, in other words, need not correspond or be proportionate to the
desert of the offender.
Though a rapist is culpable for his crime, the victim's moral right
to use deadly force to defend herself need not turn on that culpability.
What matters, for self-defense purposes, is that every person-includ-
ing every woman-has the right not to be physically occupied by an-
other being, whether or not that being is a moral person (as a rapist is
and an embryo or fetus might not be) and whether or not that being is
at fault in physically occupying her. When a pro-life advocate recog-
nizes the legitimacy of abortion to save the life of the mother, she
implicitly accepts that an embryo or fetus occupies a woman's body in
a manner that may call for aggression in self-defense. If she accepts
that deadly self-defense extends-as it does, under law-beyond
threats to life to include threats to bodily integrity, it follows that a
woman's BI gives her the proper authority to expel an unwanted fe-
tus from inside her body, even though such expulsion necessarily and
always terminates the life of the innocent invader. 72 The notion of
70 E.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-3-23 (2008); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-411 (2008); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 18-1-704 (2004).
71 The relevance of the penalty provision is that it suggests that even though a culpable
rapist may not be deserving of the death penalty, this conclusion has no necessary effect on the
measures a victim may take to protect herself against being violated. See Coker v. Georgia, 433
U.S. 584, 592 (1977); Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2650-51 (2008).
72 In Creation and Abortion, Frances Kamm suggests that the person defending against the
invading embryo or fetus-if we assume the latter is a moral person-must herself be innocent
of fault in bringing about the situation in which she is occupied by the embryo or fetus, if abor-
tion is to be justified. F.M. KAMM, CREATION AND ABORTION: A STUDY IN MORAL AND LEGAL
PHILOSOPHY 47 (1992). One could argue, as I have discussed elsewhere, Sherry F. Colb, Abor-
tion, Sarah Palin's Amniocentesis, and the Pro-Life View of Sex, FINDLAW, Sept. 15, 2008, http://
writ.news.findlaw.com/colb/20080915.html; Sherry F. Colb, What Proponents of the "Rape Ex-
ception" Teach Us About Abortion, FINDLAw, July 11, 2007, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/colb/
20070711.html, that having sexual relations represents "fault" in bringing about the fetal inva-
sion that abortion aims to terminate. Kamm responds to this argument that it would be too
much to demand that a person remain celibate to avoid an unwanted pregnancy (a demand
which the "sex as consent to pregnancy" view implicitly makes of women). See KAMM, supra, at
153. Kamm also states that the embryo would be no better off if the sex had not occurred
because it would not then be in a position to come into existence either. See id. My response to
the assumption-of-risk argument is that the odds of a pregnancy are slim enough and the conse-
quences great enough to make the assumption-of-risk notion inapposite to the sexual context.
One would, however, face a harder case-if one believed an embryo or fetus to be a person-if
someone had chosen to implant an embryo in her uterus but later wished to abort. There, the
"odds" argument changes considerably (fifty to seventy-five percent in some cases), the notion
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abortion as self-defense, even when the mother's life is not in danger,
thus demonstrates the legitimacy of extending the uncontroversial
idea of the "life of the mother" exception to the assault on bodily
integrity that a pregnancy represents. And it does so without having
to take a position on the worth or moral personhood of a fetus.
Pro-life advocates who support a life-of-the-mother exception
might here object that when a woman seeks an abortion for a reason
other than to save her life, her reason may have nothing to do with the
physical intrusions inherent in pregnancy. Though the stated rationale
for the right to abortion is a woman's bodily integrity, the actual deci-
sion to have an abortion often rests on the desire to prevent a baby
from coming into existence at all-the same desire that motivates the
use of contraception.
To see this point, consider some common reasons for a woman to
choose to have an abortion. Perhaps she is still virtually a child her-
self and wants to become educated and grow up before taking on the
responsibilities of caring for a child. Perhaps she is not interested in a
long-term involvement with the man who impregnated her but does
not wish to raise a child alone. Maybe she was raped and does not
want to bring into the world a child who resulted from that violent
attack. Or maybe she already has several children and cannot afford
to take care of them if she adds another to their number.
All of these reasons for abortion operate, on their face, indepen-
dently of the physical burdens of pregnancy. The women in these ex-
amples are choosing not to have their children exist, thereby
expressing a preference that appears to sound more in the OSI than in
the BII, and therefore seem vulnerable to the pro-life critique of as-
serting a right to prevent children from coming into existence when
one is actually terminating the life of an existing child. At least in the
case of such abortions, a pro-life critic might claim, one must confront
the question avoided explicitly in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, of
when life (in the sense of moral personhood) begins.73
In response to this argument, which appears to have some force,
it is worth exploring once again the right to repel a rape by deadly
force. In some cases, a woman who refuses to consent to sex does not
feel like having the interested man inside her body because she finds
him unattractive. In other cases, however, a woman might simply
of "fault" becomes more plausible, and, for Kamm's purposes, the embryo might have indeed
been better off without implantation because someone else could have implanted it and taken
the pregnancy to term.
73 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
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want to wait until she knows the man better before having sex (even
though she desires sex with him already). And in still other cases, a
woman might reject a man's advances-though she is attracted to the
man-because she and he are of different racial groups, and she be-
lieves interracial sex is immoral.
As we see in these examples, a woman can have a variety of moti-
vations for refusing to have sex, some of which concern bodily integ-
rity but others of which are either relatively trivial or downright
offensive. Regardless of her basis for refusing to have sex, if a man
nonetheless goes ahead and attempts to force her, she has the right to
use deadly force-if necessary-to stop him. In the intimate realm,
reasons matter much less than the ultimate decision. When the deci-
sion is to refuse consent, it must be honored, period.
Reasons that would be inappropriate or even actionable in other
contexts, in other words, do not undermine a woman's right to protect
her own bodily integrity against a sexual intrusion. Though a woman
cannot fire a man for his race, she can refuse to have sex with him for
this or any other reason. Because her bodily integrity is at stake, the
motive for her actions becomes irrelevant.
If the man in question were instead applying for a job as an un-
derwear model, the woman's reasons for refusing to hire him would
now become not only relevant but potentially dispositive. It is sensi-
ble to refuse to hire a person as an underwear model if that person is
extremely unattractive. If, on the other hand, the woman refuses to
hire the man because she finds him attractive and wants to sleep with
him (but may not do so if he works as her subordinate), that reason
would be less appropriate and might even violate the law against sex
discrimination.74 Finally, if the woman chooses not to hire the man on
account of his race, despite the fact that he is very attractive and
therefore highly qualified for the job, such a choice would plainly con-
stitute illegal race discrimination.75 Once we exit the intimate realm,
the reasons for our actions-and their perceived legitimacy-become
highly relevant to crafting an appropriate legal response.
Returning to abortion and the alternative world in which a fetus
develops inside an artificial womb instead of a woman's body, a wo-
man's reasons for wanting to terminate the life of a fetus might well
become salient if the fetus were at a stage of development at which
moral personhood attaches.
74 See generally Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701-716.,
78 Stat. 241, 253-66; Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63-67 (1986).
75 See generally Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703, 78 Stat. at 255-57.
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It may be, of course, that like the woman deciding whether or not
to hire a man, a woman who wanted an abortion because she did not
feel ready for a child, etc., would feel differently if she did not have to
be pregnant for that child to develop from a fetus into a baby. That is,
she might experience a pregnancy as too burdensome to endure if she
truly does not want to keep the child, but she might have no objection
to the child's coming into being in an artificial womb, if she does not
have to have anything to do with it.
A pregnancy not only imposes a serious intrusion on a woman,
but it also compels a level of intimacy that can result in bonding. If a
woman does not want to have or keep a child, then such bonding and
attachment could prove devastating to her when she gives up the child
for adoption. 76 Alternatively, she might find herself unable to give up
the child after carrying it to term and could therefore face the
problems that motivated her to want an abortion in the first place
(inability to afford the child, a lack of commitment from-or a desire
to avoid entanglement with-the father, etc.).
The artificial womb, then, could help facilitate the feeling in a
woman that she is not the "mother" of the entity coming into being.
This could explain, for example, the experience of people who donate
sperm or eggs and feel that they are doing something nice for people
who want children (or that they are making some money)77 but do not
consider themselves to have had and then lost a child.
It is quite possible, then, that a woman who seeks an abortion for
reasons unconnected to the physicality of pregnancy might nonethe-
less lose the desire to terminate the life of her fetus once pregnancy is
no longer a factor. If, on the other hand, she still wanted to terminate
its life, then she could no longer invoke the BII. Relying exclusively
on the OSI would, in this context, mean that much would turn on
when the zygote graduates from being a potential person-unentitled
76 Cf. ANN FESSLER, THE GIRLS WHO WENT AWAY: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF WOMEN
WHO SURRENDERED CHILDREN FOR ADOPTION IN THE DECADES BEFORE ROE V. WADEpassim
(2006) (detailing the trauma experienced by women, prior to Roe v. Wade. 410 U.S. 113 (1973)
who were compelled to surrender their babies for adoption).
77 See Peggy Orenstein, Your Gamete, Myself, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2007 (Magazine), at
37-38, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/15/magazine/15egg-t.html?sq=Orenstein%20
egg%20donation&st=cse&scp=1&pagewanted=all. Of course, some women voluntarily serve as
gestational surrogates as well. See Alex Kuczynski, Her Body, My Baby, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30,
2008 (Magazine), at 42, available at http://www.nytimes.coml2008/11/30/magazine/3OSurrogate-t.
html.
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to come into existence-into a moral person with the same rights as a
* baby.78
We thus see that despite the moral controversies surrounding
birth-control and abortion, there exists an important consensus be-
tween embattled groups about the two essential elements of reproduc-
tive freedom: the OSI, encompassing an interest in deciding to
prevent the existence of children that one does not want to have, and
the BI, encompassing a construction of pregnancy that acknowledges
the embryo or fetus as an occupying (though innocent) force inside its
mother that will-at least in some cases-justify its expulsion and con-
sequent death. As I argue, the basis for a "life of the mother" excep-
tion articulated by many within the pro-life movement, coupled with
the modern view of self-defensive homicide as extending to threats
against bodily integrity, leads to a far more expansive freedom to
abort for a woman facing an unwanted pregnancy than one limited to
the case when termination is necessary to preserve her life. And this
analysis does not turn on how we understand the status of the fetus.
IV. Does the OSI Preclude Regard for Future Generations?
In the last three sections of this Article, we have examined the
moral consequences of consensus about the OSI and the BII and have
concluded that we have no obligation to create future generations and
may have rights of destruction vis-A-vis existing people, to the extent
that they pose a threat to a pregnant woman's life or bodily integrity.
To suggest that we do not have to create future generations, however,
might seem to entail the proposition that we do not have to do any-
thing for future generations. After all, future generations-whether
defined to include embryos or not-might seem to have no interests
78 A moral acknowledgment of fetal personhood in the artificial womb could thus contrib-
ute to overpopulation, depending on where the line is drawn, but this problem is hardly unique
to societies that identify fetal personhood prior to birth. See April Adell, Note, Fear of Persecu-
tion for Opposition to Violations of the International Human Right to Found a Family as a Legal
Entitlement to Asylum for Chinese Refugees, 24 HOFSTRA L. REV. 789, 791-92 (1996) (discussing
how China's one-child policy results in a situation where abortion is not only permitted but
encouraged and sometimes compelled); Kathleen Fackelmann, It's a Girl! Is Sex Selection the
First Step to Designer Children?, 154 Sci. NEws 337, 350 (1998) (discussing how the technology
could affect China's policy, given the preference for boys); Patrick Goodenough, China's 'One-
Child Policy' Results in Forced Abortions, Infanticide, CNSNEWS.COM, Feb. 14. 2001, http://cn-
snews.com/public/content/article.aspx?RsrcID=10007; cf Supplemental Appropriations Act of
1985, Pub. L. No. 99-88, 99 Stat. 293, 323 (1985) (most recent approved text at Pub. L. No. 107-
115, 115 Stat. 2118, 2121 (2002) (targeting China's one-child policy by refusing funds to "any
organization or program which, as determined by the President of the United States, supports or
participates in the management of a program of coercive abortion or involuntary sterilization")).
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right now, if they do not even have an interest in coming into
existence.
A. Preserving a Borrowed Resource
In thinking about as-yet-nonexistent people making claims on us,
it is useful to consider an analogy. Jake is a student in a first-year law
school class. He sits at a particular desk when he takes contracts, and
he decides to use a pen-knife to carve obscenities into his desk when-
ever he has trouble following what his professor is saying. By the end
of the year, his desk is covered with his artwork. It is clear that he has
done harm to the law school, which owns the desk.
In addition, however, he has harmed the future occupants of his
desk. They will see-and perhaps be offended by-what he has
carved in a desk that was only on loan to him. He has acted wrong-
fully toward those future 1L's, even though their identities have yet to
be determined. One might say that most of those future law students
have not yet even come into existence as law students. Nonetheless,
he has violated their interests, and he has done so at the moment that
he began his vandalism.
Despite Jake's having violated someone's cognizable interests or
rights (those of the persons to be seated at his desk), it is also the case
that no one person has a right to get into the law school where Jake
had occasion to carve obscenities into his desk. Unlike potential peo-
ple, of course, potential law students (or at least a large number of
them) do have some interests (in the ability to obtain food, shelter,
and arguably a fair process by which they will be either selected or
rejected by Jake's law school). What they lack, however, are interests
as law students, because none of them has yet been selected for that
status.
Nonetheless, whoever among them will be selected and will go to
Jake's law school and will sit in Jake's seat (all of which will be deter-
mined in the future) has demands that she can make of Jake now, and
one of those demands is that Jake not deface the desk at which she
will be sitting for a semester of her life.
If the student sitting next to Jake notices him carving and says,
"Hey, don't do that; it's not fair to the next occupant," he is cham-
pioning that demand on behalf of someone who-like people who do
not yet exist-is in no position to articulate her own interests or
needs. Though the future status of the law student is, therefore, con-
tingent, her interest in having a clean and obscenity-free desk in the
future is not. This is, of course, how it can be coherent (notwithstand-
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ing Justice Scalia's suggestion otherwise 79) to extend standing to a
spokesperson claiming that it is wrong to despoil the environment in a
manner that will hurt people, even if most of those people have yet to
materialize. Future persons necessarily require someone other than
those future persons to speak out on behalf of their interests.
B. Endowing Future Persons with Rights
Legal debates about maternal-fetal conflicts outside of the abor-
tion context provide a useful illustration of how one might consider
the interests of people who do not yet exist. Let us assume, for pur-
poses of this discussion, that an embryo or fetus is not a moral person
and therefore has no more of a right to come into existence than any
other potential person. The OSI therefore allows for the destruction
of the fetus. Let us also put to one side the BII of the mother,
which-as we saw in the context of our earlier abortion discussion-
can trump the interests of even an extant person.
C. Fetal Endangerment by the Non-Aborting Mother
A number of states have provided for the criminal prosecution of
women who expose themselves to harmful substances during preg-
nancy.80 It might appear that anyone who opposes the criminalization
of abortion on the basis of the OSI would necessarily oppose criminal-
ization of a pregnant woman's fetal endangerment (through the inges-
tion of harmful substances during pregnancy, for example). If one is
permitted to kill another entity, after all, then doesn't it follow a forti-
ori that one is allowed to injure that entity nonlethally?
The short answer is no. As I note elsewhere, one might permit
killing under some circumstances (for punishment of crime) while si-
multaneously prohibiting torture or mutilation under those same cir-
79 In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564 n.2 (1992), Justice Scalia wrote for a
majority of Justices that "[the imminence requirement] has been stretched beyond the breaking
point when, as here, the plaintiff alleges only an injury at some indefinite future time, and the
acts necessary to make the injury happen are at least partly within the plaintiff's own control."
80 "Under a legal theory known as fetal rights, more than 20 states have enacted laws that
target women for actions taken during pregnancy." Mark Reutter, Laws About Pregnant Wo-
men and Substance Abuse Questioned, INSIDE ILL., Dec. 15, 2008, at 8, available at http://
news.illinois.edu/ii/O5/1215/1215.pdf; see also, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 415.503(9)(a), (g) (West
1989) (repealed 1998); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/2-3(1)(c) (West 1992); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 31-6-4-3.1 (Bums 1993); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.5562 (West 2003); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 432b.330 (Michie 2006); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1101 (West 1993); id. tit. 10, § 7102-04;
UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-4-404 (1989).
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cumstances. 81  In the contrast between abortion and fetal
endangerment, however, the "greater includes the lesser" argument
fails for an additional reason as well.
In having an abortion, a woman does one of two things: she either
prevents a moral person from coming into existence or she kills an
existing moral person. If one believes that she does the first-merely
prevents a person's existence-then one ought to find abortion unob-
jectionable. (If, on the other hand, one believes that she does the sec-
ond-kills an existing person-then the issue becomes more
difficult.82) Assuming one takes the view that a fetus is not a moral
person until birth and that abortion therefore has no moral dimen-
sion-that one's OSI continues to be dispositive-could one nonethe-
less support a fetal-endangerment statute?
Consider what occurs during fetal endangerment. A pregnant
woman ingests a harmful substance that does not kill the fetus. She
thereby increases the odds that the baby to whom she will give birth
will suffer physical or mental deficits. Accordingly, the harm she in-
flicts affects not only a fetus but a future baby, whose later moral sta-
tus will be relatively uncontroversial. If, in other words, Jane Roe
drinks alcohol and consequently gives birth to a baby with fetal alco-
hol syndrome, she has thereby inflicted harm on the baby, a moral
person, regardless of whether or not the fetus had any individual
moral entitlements.
A pregnant woman who will not terminate her pregnancy but
who ingests harmful substances, then, is behaving in a manner that
violates her obligation to future generations. When her baby is born
exhibiting the signs of that violation, a fetal-endangerment statute ac-
cordingly seeks to punish her for that disregard, despite the fact that
her actions preceded the presence (and rights-holding status) of her
baby, by hypothesis. For this reason, the most destructive fetal-endan-
germent conduct would tend to occur in the earliest stages of preg-
nancy, when the possibility of harming development (and thus the
future baby) is at its greatest, while the moral personhood of the fetus
is most strongly disputed (and thus the OSI most compelling). Fetal
endangerment, understood in this way, is primarily an offense against
the future baby rather than the present fetus. It thus resembles the
act of a corporation that releases huge amounts of greenhouse gases
81 Sherry F. Colb, Why Is Torture "Different?" and How "Different" Is It?, 30 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1411, 1415 (2009).
82 For a discussion of how one might be pro-choice despite the view that a fetus is a moral
person, see supra Part III.
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into the air, where the greatest harm is committed against future
persons. 83
Conclusion
We have observed that despite the apparently intractable divi-
sions between disputants on questions of reproductive rights, there is
a surprising amount of consensus on its two foundations: the Offspring
Selection Interest ("OSI") and the Bodily Integrity Interest ("BII").
Across the centuries and the political spectrum, there is broad agree-
ment that potential persons do not have a right to come into existence
and that people have an interest in selecting with whom to have their
future children. And in the United States in modern times, there is a
widely shared belief, even among the pro-life, that in pregnancy, an
embryo or fetus acts upon a woman's bodily integrity in a manner
that, at least in extreme cases, justifies termination in self-defense. As
I argue, this position necessarily embraces the BI and its application
to pregnancy and, in light of self-defense principles that animate
American law, leads quite naturally to a more general recognition of
abortion rights.
We have seen as well that there is a tendency to conflate the OSI
and the BII and thus to generate confusion about which rights people
ought to have and why such rights exist. Areas including intra-couple
frozen embryo and abortion disputes as well as debates over fetal-
83 In reality, as it turns out, both pro-life and pro-choice advocates have strong misgivings
about fetal-endangerment laws of this sort. Pro-life individuals worry, with good reason, that if
abortion is legal but fetal endangerment is not, then a woman who uses harmful substances can
most effectively escape criminal sanctions by obtaining an abortion. See Sherry F. Colb, Woman
on Trial for Delivering Cocaine to Her Unborn Child: A Surprisingly Difficult Case, FINDLAw,
Aug. 11, 2004, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/colb/20040811.html (stating that those that wish to
protect unborn children would not want to prosecute a pregnant mother for drug use, because
that would encourage abortions). Pro-choice individuals find offensive the notion of closely reg-
ulating pregnant women in the manner that such statutes entail. See NARAL Pro-Choice Mis-
siouri, A Legislative Analysis of S.B. 766, http://www.prochoicemissouri.org/issues/factsheets/
200801162.shtml (last visited July 25, 2009) (stating criticisms of a fetal-endangerment statute).
And both groups worry that such legislation will deter drug-addicted women from seeking medi-
cal assistance and thereby, paradoxically, increase the exposure of fetuses to harmful substances.
The Rutherford Institute, a pro-life-oriented group, and the National Abortion Rights Action
League both opposed a hospital's policy of drug testing pregnant women and turning over posi-
tive results to the police. See Brief for The Rutherford Institute as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioners at 20, Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 52 U.S. 67 (2001) (No. 99-936) (noting that the
stress of a prosecution "elevates the burden" on the "fetal patient"); Brief of the NARAL Foun-
dation et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 2, Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532
U.S. 67 (2001) (No. 99-936). The Supreme Court ultimately invalidated the policy as an unrea-
sonable search or seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532
U.S. 67, 68 (2001).
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protection legislation expose the impact of such conflation and the
importance of bringing clarity to these discussions so that we may bet-
ter understand what is at stake and how to apply the OSI and the BIJ
to new problems that we face in the technological age.
Finally, we have addressed the question of how we can owe any-
thing to future generations if we have no obligation-as per the OSI-
to create these generations. The answer at which we arrived is that
though we need not create people, we can anticipate that whatever
our own individual reproductive behavior, there will in fact be people
in the future, and those people will have entitlements as against us,
much in the way that a future occupant of a classroom desk has enti-
tlements as against the present occupant. On the assumption that
such people will in fact come into existence, we must not act in a way
that will deprive them of the ability to thrive. Putting aside the bodily
integrity interest, I argue that it is this entitlement-of the people who
will exist-that animates at least some prosecutions against women
who ingest harmful substances during pregnancy. Even if we assume
that a fetus is not a person and the OSI thus permits us to kill a fetus
with impunity, it does not necessarily follow that we may harm fetal
development in a way that impairs the lives of later children who will
be born.
Some day, someone will likely invent a successful means of ges-
tating a human embryo through fetal development outside the human
body. When this occurs, reproductive rights conflicts will rightly
center on the question of when "life" or "personhood" begins, be-
cause this is the point at which the OSI vanishes. This question will
then represent the site of fierce but necessary ideological battles. Un-
til then, however, our shared beliefs in the OSI and the BII and their
connection to reproductive rights should allow us more successfully to
navigate the rocky journey toward reproductive rights.
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